Why Is Workplace Sexual Harassment Underreported? The Value of Outside Options amid the Threat of Retaliation
American Economic Review · 2021 · Gordon B. Dahl、Matthew Knepper
中文摘要
为何职场性骚扰长期存在举报不足现象？本文提出如下假说：雇主通过以报复性解雇相威胁，迫使受害者保持沉默；并通过估计降低劳动者外部选择价值的外部冲击是否会加剧举报不足，来检验这一理论。在较弱的假设下，正式投诉严重程度的上升意味着举报不足有所加剧。本文将这一洞见与向美国平等就业机会委员会（EEOC）提交的指控质量的客观衡量指标相结合，开展两项分析。第一，本文评估在经济衰退期间、外部劳动力市场选择有限时，劳动者是否会更有选择性地举报性骚扰。本文估计，州—行业月度失业率每上升一个百分点，被EEOC认定为有依据的性骚扰指控占比便提高0.5%—0.7%。在男性雇员占比较高的行业以及男性管理者占比较高的机构中，这一效应更强。第二，本文检验较低的失业保险待遇是否会为职场性骚扰受害者保持沉默创造经济激励。本文发现，在大衰退后北卡罗来纳州失业保险（UI）计划待遇削减50%后，性骚扰指控的选择性提高了30%以上。NBER工作论文系列的机构订阅者和发展中国家居民可在www.nber.org免费下载本文，无须支付额外费用。
Abstract
Why is workplace sexual harassment chronically underreported? We hypothesize that employers coerce victims into silence through the threat of a retaliatory firing, and test this theory by estimating whether external shocks that reduce the value of a worker's outside options exacerbate underreporting. Under mild assumptions, a rise in the severity of formal complaints is indicative of increased underreporting. Combining this insight with an objective measure of the quality of charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), we perform two analyses. First, we assess whether workers report sexual harassment more selectively during recessions, when outside labor market options are limited. We estimate the fraction of sexual harassment charges deemed to have merit by the EEOC increases by 0.5-0.7% for each one percentage point increase in a state-industry's monthly unemployment rate. The effect is amplified in industries employing a larger fraction of men and in establishments with a higher share of male managers. Second, we test whether less generous UI benefits create economic incentives for victims of workplace sexual harassment to remain silent. We find the selectivity of sexual harassment charges increases by more than 30% in response to a 50% cut to North Carolina's Unemployment Insurance (UI) program following the Great Recession.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.