最优税收与市场势力

American Economic Review · 2024 · [{"name": "Jan Eeckhout", "affiliation": ["Barcelona School of Economics"]}, {"name": "Chunyang Fu", "affiliation": ["Central University of Finance and Economics"]}, {"name": "Wenjian Li", "affiliation": ["Zhejiang University"]}, {"name": "Xi Weng", "affiliation": ["Peking University"]}]

中文摘要

当企业具有市场势力时，最优所得税是否应当改变？我们分析规划者应如何对工人的劳动收入和企业家的利润进行最优征税。我们推导出依赖于加成率的最优税率，并识别出四个不同的组成部分：米尔利斯式激励效应、对市场势力负外部性的庇古税式修正、通过改变要素价格实现的再分配，以及将产出重新配置至生产率最高的企业。我们量化了美国经济的最优税率，并就在存在市场势力的情况下如何利用所得税实现收入再分配、同时激励生产，提出了具体方案。（JEL D24, D31, D43, H21, H23, H24, H25）

Abstract

Should optimal income taxation change when firms have market power? We analyze how the planner can optimally tax labor income of workers and profits of entrepreneurs. We derive optimal tax rates that depend on markups and identify four distinct components: the Mirrleesian incentive effect, the Pigouvian tax correction of the negative externality of market power, redistribution through altered factor prices, and reallocation of output toward the most productive firms. We quantify the optimal tax for the US economy and provide concrete proposals how to use income taxation to redistribute income while incentivizing production in the presence of market power. (JEL D24, D31, D43, H21, H23, H24, H25)