外商直接投资、全球价值链与劳工权利: 不存在逐底竞争?
Foreign Direct Investment, Global Value Chains, and Labor Rights: No Race-to-The-Bottom?
Journal of Development Economics · 2023 · [{"name": "Hyejoon Im", "affiliation": ["Yeungnam University"]}, {"name": "John McLaren", "affiliation": ["University of Virginia"]}]
中文摘要
全球化会削弱工人的权利吗？现有数据尚无定论；已有证据表明，当发展中国家进入全球价值链（GVC）的机会增加时，该国往往会强化劳工权利。我们构建一个程式化模型，刻画跨国企业为全球价值链选择东道国区位的行为，其中每个东道国政府选择本国工人集体谈判权的强度。各国政府需要在更强谈判权带来的直接收益，与因此将跨国企业驱赶至竞争对手国家所造成的影响之间进行权衡。我们发现，就交易成本降低这一意义而言，全球化程度的提高对均衡状态下的工人权利没有影响；但某一国家自身成本的下降往往会强化该国的劳工权利，而随着更多国家被纳入全球经济，在极限情况下往往会削弱这些权利。
Abstract
Does globalization weaken worker’s rights? Data is inconclusive; what evidence there is suggests a developing country tends to strengthen labor rights when its access to global value chains (GVC’s) increases. We present a stylized model of multinational firms choosing host locations for global value chains, in which each host-country government chooses the strength of collective-bargaining rights for its workers. Each government trades the direct benefit of stronger bargaining rights against the effect of chasing multinationals away to rival countries. We find that an increase in globalization in the sense of lower transaction costs has no effect on equilibrium workers’ rights, but lower costs for one country tend to strengthen that country’s labor rights, and adding more countries to the global economy tends, in the limit, to weaken them.