中文摘要
尽管经历了数十年的改革，早婚和嫁妆在印度农村地区仍然普遍存在。本文考察女性政治代表权是否会改变这些习俗。我构建了一个模型，其中家庭在面临女儿不婚所带来的社会惩罚时，选择女儿的结婚时间与嫁妆数额。女性领导人通过拓展女性的经济机会，提高了女儿的价值并推迟其结婚时间。当社会惩罚较高时，婚期推迟会导致嫁妆增加。我利用印度1992年宪法修正案产生的外生变动对此进行检验；该修正案规定，村委会（pradhan）席位的三分之一须保留给女性。来自一项具有代表性的农村调查的数据显示，女性村委会主席使结婚时间推迟1.22年，并使嫁妆增加68%。女性劳动力参与率上升29%可部分解释这一推迟。嫁妆的增加集中在父权制邦，在这些地区，不婚所受到的惩罚最为严厉。研究结果凸显了在具有约束力的社会限制下，政治赋权在改变婚姻规范方面的潜力与局限。
Abstract
Despite decades of reform, early marriage and dowry remain pervasive in rural India. I examine whether women's political representation shifts these practices. I develop a model in which households choose daughters' marriage timing and dowry, facing social penalties for non-marriage. Female leaders, by expanding women's economic opportunities, increase the value of daughters and delay marriage. When social penalties are high, delays raise dowry. I test this using exogenous variation from India's 1992 constitutional amendment, which reserved one-third of village council (pradhan) seats for women. Data from a representative rural survey shows that female pradhans delay marriage by 1.22 years and increase dowry by 68%. A 29% rise in female labor force participation partly explains the delay. Dowry increases are concentrated in patriarchal states, where penalties for non-marriage are most severe. The findings highlight both the potential and the limits of political empowerment in transforming marital norms under binding social constraints.