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疫苗的政治后果:来自接种资格规则的准实验证据

The Political Consequences of Vaccines: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Eligibility Rules
Journal of Development Economics · 2025 · Emilio Depetris-Chauvín、Felipe González

中文摘要

疫苗极大增进了人类福祉,但我们对公共管理的疫苗接种行动所产生的政治影响仍知之甚少。本文通过研究智利的案例填补这一空白:智利罕见地同时具备高风险选举、自愿投票制度,以及截至选举日仅推进过半的疫苗接种进程这三项条件。关键在于,疫苗的推广依赖于外生的资格规则,我们将这些规则与预分析计划相结合,以进行因果识别。我们发现,较高的疫苗接种率会提高政治参与度,并且平均而言会降低选民对寻求连任的在任者的支持。机制分析表明,疫苗对在任者的影响因其执政表现而异。

Abstract

Vaccines are responsible for large increases in human welfare and yet we know little about the political impacts of publicly-managed vaccination campaigns. We fill this gap by studying the case of Chile, which offers a rare combination of a high-stakes election, voluntary voting, and a vaccination process halfway implemented by election day. Crucially, the roll-out of vaccines relied on exogenous eligibility rules which we combine with a pre-analysis plan for causal identification. We find that higher vaccination rates boost political participation and, on average, decrease support for incumbents seeking reelection. An analysis of mechanisms reveals that vaccines affected incumbents differently depending on their performance in office.
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