Journal of the European Economic Association · 2026 · Francesca Caselli、Matilde Faralli、Paolo Manasse、Ugo Panizza
中文摘要
本文研究一国在主权违约普遍发生的时期, 不对其债务违约是否能从中获益。我们聚焦于哥伦比亚——20 世纪 80 年代唯一未发生违约的拉美大国。利用档案研究以及针对哥伦比亚违约概率的正式计量估计, 我们表明, 在 20 世纪 80 年代初, 哥伦比亚的基本面与那些对其债务违约的拉美国家并无显著差异。随后我们记录到, 哥伦比亚之所以做出不同的选择, 是由于当局相信在国际资本市场维持良好声誉将带来可观回报。我们讨论了来自美国的高层政治支持如何使哥伦比亚得以对债权人尤为友好, 并避免接受国际货币基金组织 (IMF) 的项目安排。我们的反事实分析表明, 在短期至中期内, 哥伦比亚因避免了显性违约而获益。我们还检验了哥伦比亚在 20 世纪 80 年代的行为是否带来了持久的声誉收益。利用基于一次大规模资本流入骤停 (sudden stop) 的事件研究, 我们发现没有证据支持此类收益。
Abstract
This paper studies whether a country can benefit from not defaulting on its debts during times of widespread sovereign defaults. We focus on Colombia, which is the only large Latin American country that did not default in the 1980s. Using archival research and formal econometric estimates of Colombia’s probability of default, we show that in the early 1980s, Colombia’s fundamentals were not significantly different from those of the Latin American countries that defaulted on their debts. We then document that the different choice made by Colombia was due to the authorities’ belief that maintaining a good reputation in the international capital market would have substantial payoffs. We discuss how high-level political support from the US allowed Colombia to be particularly creditor-friendly and avoid an International Monetary Fund (IMF) program. Our counterfactual analysis shows that in the short to medium run, Colombia benefited from avoiding an explicit default. We also test whether Colombia’s behavior in the 1980s led to long-lasting reputational benefits. Using an event study based on a large sudden stop, we find no evidence for such gains.