Fiscal Externalities of Transaction Taxes: Evidence from the Los Angeles Mansion Tax
Journal of Public Economics · 2025 · Dan Green、Vikram Jambulapati、Jack Liebersohn、Tejaswi Velayudhan
Abstract
We estimate the fiscal externalities of a property transfer tax, the Los Angeles “Mansion Tax”, on the revenues from property taxes when assessed values are closely tied to transactions. In California, as in over half of U.S. states, growth in tax assessments between transactions lags market values, so any reduction in transaction frequency reduces the growth of property tax revenue. Assuming that Measure ULA did not directly change transaction rates outside of Los Angeles, we estimate a sizable fiscal externality: in our benchmark calibration, the resulting property-tax revenue loss offsets about four-fifths of the revenue generated by the transfer tax, and under alternative parameter values the offset can range from 30 percent to over 100 percent. The net revenue loss is larger for high-value and commercial properties.