交易税的财政外部性: 来自洛杉矶豪宅税的证据

Journal of Public Economics · 2025 · [{"name": "Dan Green", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Vikram Jambulapati", "affiliation": ["University of California San Diego"]}, {"name": "Jack Liebersohn", "affiliation": ["University of California, Irvine"]}, {"name": "Tejaswi Velayudhan", "affiliation": ["University of California, Irvine"]}]

中文摘要

我们估计了一项财产转让税——洛杉矶“豪宅税”——在评估价值与交易密切挂钩情况下对财产税收入产生的财政外部性。在加利福尼亚州，与美国半数以上的州一样，两次交易之间的税收评估额增长滞后于市场价值，因此交易频率的任何下降都会降低财产税收入的增长速度。假定Measure ULA并未直接改变洛杉矶以外地区的交易率，我们估计出了相当大的财政外部性：在我们的基准校准中，由此产生的财产税收入损失抵消了转让税所产生收入的约五分之四；在替代参数取值下，抵消幅度可从30%到超过100%不等。对于高价值和商业地产，净收入损失更大。

Abstract

We estimate the fiscal externalities of a property transfer tax, the Los Angeles “Mansion Tax”, on the revenues from property taxes when assessed values are closely tied to transactions. In California, as in over half of U.S. states, growth in tax assessments between transactions lags market values, so any reduction in transaction frequency reduces the growth of property tax revenue. Assuming that Measure ULA did not directly change transaction rates outside of Los Angeles, we estimate a sizable fiscal externality: in our benchmark calibration, the resulting property-tax revenue loss offsets about four-fifths of the revenue generated by the transfer tax, and under alternative parameter values the offset can range from 30 percent to over 100 percent. The net revenue loss is larger for high-value and commercial properties.