排干沼泽: 反精英民粹主义理论

中文摘要

我们研究了一个针对反精英民粹主义改革（即“排干沼泽”）的民众需求模型：用只会随时间积累经验的新手取代经验丰富的公务员。选民得益于经验丰富的公务员，因为他们在提供公共物品方面更为有效，也更善于识别紧急威胁。然而，公务员的政策偏好并不总是与选民的偏好一致。这一权衡在我们的模型中产生了两种关键力量：公务员的无能会引发他们与选民之间的分歧，而他们的有效性则赋予了他们更大的权力来主导政策。这两种效应都会加剧选民与公务员之间的不信任，有时会促使选民在反精英民粹主义的周期中“排干沼泽”。我们研究了哪些因素能够维持一个具有回应性的民主制度，或诱发技术官僚体制。相反，当民粹主义出现时，我们讨论哪些改革可能降低民粹主义周期的频率。

Abstract

We study a model of popular demand for anti-elite populist reforms that drain the swamp: replace experienced public servants with novices that will only acquire experience with time. Voters benefit from experienced public servants because they are more effective at delivering public goods and more competent at detecting emergency threats. However, public servants’ policy preferences do not always align with those of voters. This tradeoff produces two key forces in our model: public servants’ incompetence spurs disagreement between them and voters, and their effectiveness grants them more power to dictate policy. Both of these effects fuel mistrust between voters and public servants, sometimes inducing voters to drain the swamp in cycles of anti-elite populism. We study which factors can sustain a responsive democracy or induce a technocracy. When instead populism arises, we discuss which reforms may reduce the frequency of populist cycles.