Journal of Public Economics · 2023 · Gabriele Gratton、Barton E. Lee
中文摘要
我们研究了一个关于民众要求“清除沼泽”式反精英民粹主义改革需求的模型：用新手取代经验丰富的公职人员，而新手只能随时间推移逐渐积累经验。选民能从经验丰富的公职人员中获益，因为他们在提供公共品方面更有效，在识别紧急威胁方面也更有能力。然而，公职人员的政策偏好并不总是与选民一致。这一权衡在我们的模型中产生了两种关键力量：公职人员的能力不足会加剧其与选民之间的分歧，而其办事效力则赋予他们更大的政策主导权。这两种效应都会加深选民与公职人员之间的不信任，有时促使选民陷入反精英民粹主义的周期性“清除沼泽”行动。我们研究了哪些因素能够维持一个回应型民主，或诱致技术官僚统治。而当民粹主义确实出现时，我们讨论了哪些改革可能降低民粹主义周期发生的频率。
Abstract
We study a model of popular demand for anti-elite populist reforms that drain the swamp: replace experienced public servants with novices that will only acquire experience with time. Voters benefit from experienced public servants because they are more effective at delivering public goods and more competent at detecting emergency threats. However, public servants’ policy preferences do not always align with those of voters. This tradeoff produces two key forces in our model: public servants’ incompetence spurs disagreement between them and voters, and their effectiveness grants them more power to dictate policy. Both of these effects fuel mistrust between voters and public servants, sometimes inducing voters to drain the swamp in cycles of anti-elite populism. We study which factors can sustain a responsive democracy or induce a technocracy. When instead populism arises, we discuss which reforms may reduce the frequency of populist cycles.