排干沼泽:反精英民粹主义的一种理论

中文摘要

我们研究了一个关于民众对反精英民粹主义改革（即“抽干沼泽”）的需求模型：以新手取代经验丰富的公职人员，而新手只能随时间推移逐步积累经验。选民从经验丰富的公职人员处获益，因为他们能更有效地提供公共品，也更有能力识别紧急威胁。然而，公职人员的政策偏好并不总是与选民一致。这一权衡在我们的模型中产生了两股关键力量：公职人员的能力不足加剧了其与选民之间的分歧，而其有效性则赋予其更大的权力来主导政策。这两种效应都加剧了选民与公职人员之间的不信任，有时会促使选民在反精英民粹主义的周期中抽干沼泽。我们研究了哪些因素能够维系一个回应性的民主政体，或诱导形成技术官僚政体。当民粹主义出现时，我们讨论了哪些改革可能降低民粹主义周期的频率，包括公职人员的招募以及将其与政治隔离。我们的结果支持这样一种观点：一个更具包容性和代表性的官僚体系能够抵御反精英民粹主义。

Abstract

We study a model of popular demand for anti-elite populist reforms that drain the swamp: replace experienced public servants with novices who will only acquire experience with time. Voters benefit from experienced public servants because they are more effective at delivering public goods and more competent at detecting emergency threats. However, public servants’ policy preferences do not always align with those of voters. This tradeoff produces two key forces in our model: public servants’ incompetence spurs disagreement between them and voters, and their effectiveness grants them more power to dictate policy. Both of these effects fuel mistrust between voters and public servants, sometimes inducing voters to drain the swamp in cycles of anti-elite populism. We study which factors can sustain a responsive democracy or induce a technocracy. When populism arises, we discuss which reforms may reduce the frequency of populist cycles, including the recruitment of public servants and isolating them from politics. Our results support the view that a more inclusive and representative bureaucracy protects against anti-elite populism.