中文摘要
我们记录了2000年后中国经济一个突出却未得到充分重视的特征：一种关键上游产业由国有企业主导、下游产业则基本向民营企业竞争开放的纵向结构。我们构建了一个一般均衡模型，分析这一纵向结构——与工业化、全球化和劳动力充裕相互作用——如何塑造了中国经济。该框架为理解国有企业盈利能力、结构转型、资源错配和经济改革提供了新的见解。第一，在工业化和全球化进程中，随着下游民营企业提高生产率并面临更大的外部需求，上游国有企业的盈利能力增强，这有助于解释2002年至2007年间国有企业空前繁荣的现象。第二，削弱上游市场势力将促进劳动力从农业向非农部门重新配置，从而提高国内生产总值和总体福利。第三，向国有企业提供优惠信贷补贴，可以通过缓解上游供给不足来改善福利；因此，如果不打破国有企业的垄断势力便取消这些补贴，可能会降低福利。使用企业层面数据进行的定量分析支持了上述理论发现。我们进一步表明，这种纵向结构可以作为一种均衡结果内生形成。
Abstract
We document a prominent yet underappreciated feature of the post-2000 Chinese economy: a vertical structure in which key upstream industries are dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), while downstream industries are largely open to private competition. We develop a general-equilibrium model to analyze how this vertical structure—interacting with industrialization, globalization, and labor abundance—has shaped the Chinese economy. The framework offers new insights into SOE profitability, structural change, resource misallocation, and economic reform. First, upstream SOEs become more profitable as downstream private firms raise their productivity and face greater external demand during industrialization and globalization, helping explain the unprecedented prosperity of SOEs between 2002 and 2007. Second, reducing upstream market power would facilitate labor reallocation from agriculture to non-agricultural sectors, raising GDP and aggregate welfare. Third, preferential credit subsidies to SOEs can improve welfare by alleviating upstream under-supply; consequently, removing these subsidies without dismantling SOE monopoly power could reduce welfare. Quantitative analyses using firm-level data support the theoretical findings. We further show that this vertical structure can arise endogenously as an equilibrium outcome.