官僚如何应对混合激励合同? 来自中国空气污染控制的证据
How Do Bureaucrats Respond to Hybrid Incentive Contract? Evidence from China's Air Pollution Controls
Journal of Public Economics · 2024 · [{"name": "Guangyu Cao", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Mingwei Xu", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Xi Weng", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Lian Zhou", "affiliation": []}]
中文摘要
本文考察中国地方官员如何应对空气污染控制的最低目标——该目标是一种混合激励契约的组成部分, 该契约同时为经济增长设定了高强度激励。基于一个新颖的地级市-日度空气质量数据集, 并采用断点回归设计(RDD), 我们发现了有力证据: 当空气质量目标注定无法完成时, 空气质量往往会改善; 而一旦提前完成目标已成定局, 空气质量则会显著恶化。我们构建了一个理论模型来合理化这些发现, 并强调地方官员所面临的不确定性在塑造其应对策略中的作用。进一步分析考察了在目标完成状态已知后, 地方经济压力、未完成目标的惩罚损失、区域差异以及政治更替如何影响官员的策略性行为。本研究揭示了混合激励契约在多任务情境下的运作机制。
Abstract
This paper investigates how local bureaucrats in China respond to minimum targets for air pollution control, which are part of a hybrid incentive contract that simultaneously specifies high-powered incentives for economic growth. Using a novel prefecture-day level dataset on air quality and applying a Regression Discontinuity Design, we find strong evidence that air quality tends to improve when the air quality target is doomed to fail, but deteriorates significantly once early fulfillment of the target is secured. We develop a theoretical model to rationalize these findings and highlight the role of uncertainty faced by local bureaucrats in shaping their responses. Further analyses explore how local economic pressure, the punishment loss for failing to meet the target, regional differences, and political turnovers affect bureaucratic strategic behavior after the target completion status becomes known. This study sheds light on how hybrid incentive contracts function in a multitasking context.