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回报率管制再探

Rate of Return Regulation Revisited
Journal of Public Economics · 2026 · Karl Dunkle Werner、Stephen Jarvis

中文摘要

公用事业公司通过监管机构批准的回报率回收其资本成本。利用一个涵盖公用事业费率案例的综合数据库,我们发现,相对于多个资本成本基准,受监管的权益回报率存在显著溢价。我们表明,企业会策略性地决定何时启动新的费率案例,从而使受监管回报率对底层资本成本基准上升的反应快于对下降的反应。更高的受监管回报率激励公用事业公司拥有更多资本:权益回报率每上升一个百分点,与资本资产增加2%–4%相对应。总体而言,我们发现美国消费者每年平均承担70亿美元的超额成本。

Abstract

Utility companies recover their capital costs through regulator-approved rates of return. Using a comprehensive database of utility rate cases, we find a significant premium for regulated returns on equity relative to several capital cost benchmarks. We show that firms decide strategically when to initiate new rate cases, such that regulated returns respond more quickly to increases in underlying capital cost benchmarks than to decreases. Higher regulated returns incentivize utilities to own more capital: a one percentage point rise in return on equity corresponds to an increase in capital assets of 2%–4%. Overall we find excess costs to U.S. consumers averaging $7 billion per year.
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