The Compliance Effects of the Automatic Exchange of Information: Evidence from the Swiss Tax Amnesty
Journal of Public Economics · 2025 · [{"name": "Enea Baselgia", "affiliation": ["ETH Zurich", "Swiss Finance Institute"]}]
Abstract
This paper studies the effects of the 2017 multilateral automatic exchange of information (AEoI) on tax compliance in Switzerland. Using detailed administrative tax data and difference-indifferences designs, I find significant positive compliance effects. The AEoI prompted 107k taxpayers (2% of all) to participate in the amnesty, disclosing CHF 42.3 billion—over 6% of GDP. At the micro level, once evaders participate in the amnesty, their reported wealth increases by approximately 50% on average, with compliance effects persisting in the medium run. Furthermore, I document that tax evasion in Switzerland is widespread and significantly more evenly distributed than in other countries.