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自动信息交换的遵从效应: 来自瑞士税收特赦的证据

The Compliance Effects of the Automatic Exchange of Information: Evidence from the Swiss Tax Amnesty
Journal of Public Economics · 2025 · [{"name": "Enea Baselgia", "affiliation": ["ETH Zurich", "Swiss Finance Institute"]}]

中文摘要

本文研究2017年多边自动信息交换(AEoI)对瑞士税收遵从的影响。利用详细的税务行政数据和双重差分设计,我发现存在显著的正向遵从效应。AEoI促使10.7万名纳税人(占全部纳税人的2%)参与税收特赦,披露423亿瑞士法郎——超过GDP的6%。在微观层面,一旦逃税者参与特赦,其申报财富平均增加约50%,且遵从效应在中期内持续存在。此外,我记录到瑞士的逃税现象普遍存在,且其分布显著比其他国家更为均匀。

Abstract

This paper studies the effects of the 2017 multilateral automatic exchange of information (AEoI) on tax compliance in Switzerland. Using detailed administrative tax data and difference-indifferences designs, I find significant positive compliance effects. The AEoI prompted 107k taxpayers (2% of all) to participate in the amnesty, disclosing CHF 42.3 billion—over 6% of GDP. At the micro level, once evaders participate in the amnesty, their reported wealth increases by approximately 50% on average, with compliance effects persisting in the medium run. Furthermore, I document that tax evasion in Switzerland is widespread and significantly more evenly distributed than in other countries.
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