问责制的意外后果: 来自巴基斯坦警务的准实验证据
The Unintended Consequences of Accountability: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Policing in Pakistan
Journal of Public Economics · 2023 · [{"name": "Hamna Ahmed", "affiliation": ["Lahore School of Economics"]}, {"name": "Dareen Latif", "affiliation": ["Lahore School of Economics"]}, {"name": "Kate Vyborny", "affiliation": ["Duke University"]}]
中文摘要
我们利用巴基斯坦警方的行政微观数据，考察委托-代理关系中的数据操纵行为。我们发现，在执政党控制着特定选区、因而政治问责压力较高的地区，警方登记公民犯罪报告的可能性较低。我们报告了一系列检验，以排除这一结果可由犯罪预防增加来解释的可能性。结果与如下情形一致：官员在维持低犯罪统计数字的压力下，决定不登记部分报案。随着新的犯罪报告追踪数据库逐步推出、提升了可观测性，登记犯罪数量增加。
Abstract
We investigate data manipulation in the principal-agent relationship using administrative microdata from the police in Pakistan. We find that police are less likely to register citizens’ crime reports in areas where political accountability pressure is higher because the governing party holds a particular constituency. We report a series of tests to rule out the possibility that this result is explained by increased crime prevention. The results are consistent with officials deciding not to register some reports, under pressure to keep crime statistics low. As a new crime reports tracking database is rolled out, improving observability, the number of registered crimes increases.