移民执法的政治经济学:联邦制下的冲突与合作
The Political Economy of Immigration Enforcement: Conflict and Cooperation under Federalism
Review of Economics and Statistics · 2022 · [{"name": "Alberto Ciancio", "affiliation": ["University of Glasgow"]}, {"name": "Camilo García-Jimeno", "affiliation": ["Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago"]}]
中文摘要
摘要：选择力量常常混淆政策变化的效应。在移民执法背景下，我们通过追踪被捕移民在遣返流程中的路径，分离地方与联邦层面的努力，以应对这一挑战。80%的县在应对联邦执法时表现出策略性替代关系，而联邦层面则十分有效地将其执法力量导向合作县。我们估计，2011年联邦优先事项调整后遣返数量的下降，是由移民案件构成的变化所致，而非联邦执法力度的减弱。降低移民法院的自由裁量权，并使其摆脱对行政部门的依赖，将对遣返产生显著影响。
Abstract
Abstract Selection forces often confound the effects of policy changes. In the immigration enforcement context, we tackle this challenge tracking arrested immigrants along the deportation pipeline, isolating local and federal efforts. 80% of counties exhibit strategic substitutabilities in responding to federal enforcement, while the federal level is very effective at directing its efforts toward cooperative counties. We estimate that changes in the profile of immigration cases, and not weakened federal efforts, drove the reduction in deportations following a 2011 shift in federal priorities. Reducing immigration-court discretion and removing their dependence from the executive would have a significant impact on deportations.