市场结构与敲诈勒索:来自5万笔敲诈付款的证据
Market Structure and Extortion: Evidence from 50,000 Extortion Payments
Review of Economic Studies · 2024 · [{"name": "Zach Y. Brown", "affiliation": ["University of Michigan"]}, {"name": "Eduardo Montero", "affiliation": ["University of Chicago"]}, {"name": "Carlos Schmidt-Padilla", "affiliation": ["University of California, Berkeley"]}, {"name": "María Micaela Sviatschi", "affiliation": ["Princeton University"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 帮派之间的竞争如何影响敲诈勒索？利用萨尔瓦多一家领先的消费品和药品批发分销商提供的详细数据——包括个人向帮派支付的敲诈勒索款项记录以及销售数据，我们记录了关于敲诈勒索支付决定因素、以及敲诈勒索对企业和消费者影响的证据。我们利用2016年帮派之间达成的一项互不侵犯协议，考察合谋如何影响此前帮派相互竞争地区的敲诈勒索。尽管该协议导致竞争和暴力大幅减少，但我们发现它使敲诈勒索支付金额增加了约20%。这一增加的大部分被转嫁给零售商和消费者：零售商的配送费上升，进而导致消费者价格上涨。特别是，我们发现药品价格上涨，且因慢性病住院就诊的数量相应增加。研究结果表明，这是减少犯罪组织之间竞争的政策所产生的一项非预期后果。
Abstract
Abstract How does gang competition affect extortion? Using detailed data on individual extortion payments to gangs and sales from a leading wholesale distributor of consumer goods and pharmaceuticals in El Salvador, we document evidence on the determinants of extortion payments and the effects of extortion on firms and consumers. We exploit a 2016 non-aggression pact between gangs to examine how collusion affects extortion in areas where gangs previously competed. While the pact led to a large reduction in competition and violence, we find that it increased the amount paid in extortion by approximately 20%. Much of this increase was passed through to retailers and consumers: retailers experienced an increase in delivery fees, leading to an increase in consumer prices. In particular, we find an increase in prices for pharmaceutical drugs and a corresponding increase in hospital visits for chronic illnesses. The results point to an unintended consequence of policies that reduce competition between criminal organisations.