灾难性裁量：救济分配中的政治偏见随灾害严重程度大幅变化
Disastrous Discretion: Political Bias in Relief Allocation Varies Substantially with Disaster Severity
Review of Economics and Statistics · 2023 · [{"name": "Stephan A. Schneider", "affiliation": ["Stockholm University", "Swiss Finance Institute"]}, {"name": "Sven Kunze", "affiliation": ["ZHAW Zurich University of Applied Sciences", "Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 资源分配决策容易受到政治影响，但尚不清楚政治家在何种情况下会以党派方式动用其自由裁量权。我们分析了美国总统灾害声明的分配情况，利用1965年至2018年间所有飓风袭击的时空随机性以及党派一致性的变化。我们发现，当灾害强度非常强或非常弱时，决策并无偏误。只有在中等强度飓风过后，由总统同党人士治理的地区获得的声明数量才最多可达其他地区的两倍。这种驼峰型（倒U型）政治偏误解释了整体救灾支出的8.3%，合计每年约4亿美元。
Abstract
Abstract Allocation decisions are vulnerable to political influence, but it is unclear in which situations politicians use their discretionary power in a partisan manner. We analyze the allocation of presidential disaster declarations in the United States, exploiting the spatiotemporal randomness of all hurricane strikes from 1965 to 2018 along with changes in political alignment. We show that decisions are unbiased when disasters are either very strong or weak. Only after medium-intensity hurricanes do areas governed by presidents’ co-partisans receive up to twice as many declarations. This hump-shaped political bias explains 8.3% of overall relief spending, totaling about USD 400 million per year.