援助碎片化与腐败
Aid Fragmentation and Corruption
Review of Economics and Statistics · 2024 · [{"name": "Travers Barclay Child", "affiliation": ["China Europe International Business School", "Sungkyunkwan University"]}, {"name": "Austin L. Wright", "affiliation": ["University of Chicago"]}, {"name": "Yun Xiao", "affiliation": ["University of Gothenburg"]}]
中文摘要
摘要：援助碎片化——即多个发展机构在同一情境下同时运作——长期以来引发了人们对协调难题与腐败机会的担忧。利用阿富汗项目交付的独特数据，我们首次对援助碎片化进行了微观层面的实证分析。研究发现，由单一捐助方提供的援助能够显著减少腐败；相比之下，在援助碎片化条件下交付的项目则可能助长腐败。我们找到了支持一种理论机制的证据：该机制将基础设施和实物商品与浪费、流失联系起来。研究结果阐明了与碎片化相关的政策损失，为打击援助挪用提供了启示。
Abstract
Abstract Aid fragmentation—the simultaneous operation of multiple development agencies in one setting—has long raised concerns about coordination challenges and opportunities for corruption. Leveraging unique data on project delivery in Afghanistan, we present the first microlevel empirical analysis of aid fragmentation. We find that aid delivered by a single donor can significantly reduce corruption. Projects delivered under conditions of aid fragmentation, by contrast, can facilitate corruption. We find evidence for a theoretical mechanism linking infrastructure and physical goods with waste and leakage. Our results clarify the policy losses tied to fragmentation, yielding insights for combating misappropriation of aid.