美国选举人团中狭窄且存在争议结果的风险
The Risk of Narrow, Disputable Results in the U.S. Electoral College
Review of Economics and Statistics · 2024 · [{"name": "Michael Geruso", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research", "The University of Texas at Austin"]}, {"name": "Dean Spears", "affiliation": ["The University of Texas at Austin"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 势均力敌的选举因多种原因而重要，其中包括：由此引发的选举争议可能削弱民主合法性，并带来政治暴力风险。我们借助来自多个来源的实证选举模型的新颖应用，量化了美国总统选举中出现势均力敌结果的概率。我们表明，在选举人团（EC）制度下，出现极其微弱的胜负差距的可能性非常高。我们进一步证实，正是 EC 导致了这种势均力敌：在任何合理可比的普选制度下，这种情况都不会出现。EC 催生势均力敌选举的这一倾向，无论在当今还是纵观整个美国总统选举史，均普遍存在。
Abstract
Abstract Close elections are important for many reasons, including that consequent election disputes can weaken democratic legitimacy and risk political violence. We quantify the probability of close outcomes in U.S. presidential races with novel applications of empirical election models from several sources. We show that razor-thin margins are very likely under the Electoral College (EC). And we establish that the EC causes this closeness: It would not occur under any plausibly comparable popular vote system. The tendency of the EC to generate close elections is found today and throughout U.S. presidential voting history.