残疾保险私有化

Econometrica · 2025 · [{"name": "Arthur Seibold", "affiliation": ["Center for Economic and Policy Research", "Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München"]}, {"name": "Sebastian Seitz", "affiliation": ["Centre for European Economic Research", "University of Manchester"]}, {"name": "Sebastian Siegloch", "affiliation": ["Center for Economic and Policy Research", "Centre for European Economic Research", "University of Cologne"]}]

中文摘要

许多国家的公共残疾保险（DI）项目面临日益增长的财政压力，促使各方努力削减支出。本文研究在公共 DI 削减背景下扩大私人保险市场作用的福利效应。我们利用一项废除德国部分公共 DI 的改革，并使用来自一家大型保险公司的独特数据。我们记录到该改革产生了适度的挤出效应，使得私人 DI 的参保仍不完全。我们发现私人 DI 市场不存在逆向选择。相反，私人 DI 往往吸引高收入、高教育水平和低残疾风险的个体。利用显示偏好方法，我们估计了个体的保险估值。我们的福利分析发现，通过自愿私人市场提供部分 DI 可以改善福利。然而，分配方面的考量可能为全面的公共 DI 强制要求提供理由。

Abstract

Public disability insurance (DI) programs in many countries face growing fiscal pressures, prompting efforts to reduce spending. In this paper, we investigate the welfare effects of expanding the role of private insurance markets in the face of public DI cuts. We exploit a reform that abolished one part of German public DI and use unique data from a large insurer. We document modest crowding‐out effects of the reform, such that private DI take‐up remains incomplete. We find no adverse selection in the private DI market. Instead, private DI tends to attract individuals with high income, high education, and low disability risk. Using a revealed preference approach, we estimate individual insurance valuations. Our welfare analysis finds that partial DI provision via the voluntary private market can improve welfare. However, distributional concerns may justify a full public DI mandate.