热带地区森林火灾的起源与控制
The Origins and Control of Forest Fires in the Tropics
Review of Economic Studies · 2025 · [{"name": "Clare Balboni", "affiliation": ["London School of Economics and Political Science"]}, {"name": "Robin Burgess", "affiliation": ["London School of Economics and Political Science"]}, {"name": "Benjamin Olken", "affiliation": ["IIT@MIT", "Massachusetts Institute of Technology"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 环境外部性——即施加于他人且未获补偿的损害——是气候变化、污染、毁林和生物多样性丧失的根源。然而，关于外部性如何驱动私人决策的经验证据仍然有限。我们研究其中一种行为——非法热带森林火灾——利用印度尼西亚跨越 15 年、涵盖超过 10.7 万起火灾的每日卫星数据展开分析。天气引起的火灾蔓延风险变化，以及周边土地所有权的差异，使我们能够识别外部性在多大程度上影响了企业使用火的决策。相对于所有蔓延风险均被内部化的情形，我们发现，当企业周围是产权薄弱的未租赁政府土地时，企业会过度用火。相反，与科斯定理一致，企业对附近私人特许地风险的处理方式，与对自身土地风险的处理方式相似。政府制裁集中于蔓延至人口聚居区的火灾，也能起到威慑作用，这与庇古式威慑相一致。
Abstract
Abstract Environmental externalities—uncompensated damages imposed on others—lie at the root of climate change, pollution, deforestation and biodiversity loss. Empirical evidence is limited, however, as to how externalities drive private decision making. We study one such behaviour, illegal tropical forest fires, using 15 years of daily satellite data covering over 107,000 fires across Indonesia. Weather-induced variation in fire spread risk and variation in who owns surrounding land allow us to identify how far externalities influence the decision to use fire. Relative to when all spread risks are internalized, we find that firms overuse fire when surrounded by unleased government lands where property rights are weak. In contrast, and consistent with the Coase Theorem, firms treat risks to nearby private concessions similarly to risks to their own land. Government sanctions, concentrated on fires spreading to populated areas, also deter fires, consistent with Pigouvian deterrence.