公共部门管理者的生产率与招聘
Managers’ Productivity and Recruitment in the Public Sector
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2024 · [{"name": "Pablo Muñoz", "affiliation": ["University of Chile"]}, {"name": "Mounu Prem", "affiliation": ["Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance", "Universidad del Rosario"]}]
中文摘要
政府在吸引有才能的管理者进入公共部门方面面临诸多约束，而公共部门往往缺乏高强度激励。本文研究智利一项公务员制度改革如何改变了一类至关重要的公共部门管理者——学校校长的效能。首先，我们使用经典教师增值模型的一个扩展来估计校长的效能。随后，我们采用双重差分方法评估该改革对校长效能的影响。我们发现，在提高选拔过程的竞争性和透明度后，公立学校任命了更有效的管理者，并改善了学生的学业成果。
Abstract
Governments face many constraints in attracting talented managers to the public sector, which often lacks high-powered incentives. In this paper, we study how a civil service reform in Chile changed the effectiveness of a vital group of public sector managers: school principals. First, we estimate principal effectiveness by using an extension of the canonical teacher value-added model. Then we evaluate the effect of the reform on principal effectiveness using a difference-in-differences approach. We find that public schools appointed more effective managers and improved their students’ outcomes after increasing the competitiveness and transparency of their selection process. (JEL D73, H83, I21, J24, J45, O15)