胡萝卜与大棒：银行救助与董事任命的约束作用
The Carrot and the Stick: Bank Bailouts and the Disciplining Role of Board Appointments
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2024 · [{"name": "Christian Mücke", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Loriana Pelizzon", "affiliation": ["Goethe University Frankfurt", "Ca' Foscari University of Venice", "Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE"]}, {"name": "Vincenzo Pezone", "affiliation": ["Tilburg University"]}, {"name": "Anjan V. Thakor", "affiliation": ["Washington University in St. Louis"]}]
中文摘要
本文实证考察了美国政府用于救助困境银行的资本购买计划（CPP）及其对监管政策的启示。我们发现有力证据表明，CPP 的一项制度设计——即当受援银行拖欠向财政部支付股息达六次时，政府有权在其董事会任命独立董事——对银行行为产生了显著影响。银行厌恶这些任命：未支付股息次数的经验分布在五次处呈现出明显的断点。财政部的董事任命与银行绩效改善及CEO薪酬下降存在关联。
Abstract
We empirically examine the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) used by the US government to bail out distressed banks and its implications for regulatory policy. We find strong evidence that a feature of the CPP—the government’s ability to appoint independent directors on the board of an assisted bank that missed six dividend payments to the Treasury—had a significant effect on bank behavior. Banks were averse to these appointments—the empirical distribution of missed payments exhibits a sharp discontinuity at five. Director appointments by the Treasury were associated with improved bank performance and lower CEO pay. (JEL G21, G28, G32, G34, G35, G38, H81)