The Economic Journal · 2026 · [{"name": "Thomas Bourany", "affiliation": ["Columbia University"]}, {"name": "Jordan Rosenthal-Kay", "affiliation": ["Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco"]}]
中文摘要
为应对全球变暖，须实施碳税、可再生能源补贴和碳关税等气候政策，以逐步淘汰化石燃料消费并降低排放。此类政策的赢家与输家是谁？通过构建一个包含异质性国家、且商品与能源存在国际贸易的简单综合评估模型，我们研究了单边实施这些政策的成本，以及国际政策合作的局部成本与全球收益。为此，我们将不同政策体制下的福利变化以一阶形式表达并分解为充分统计量的函数，这些统计量取决于可观测变量和可识别弹性，例如各国的能源结构、能源租金、贸易份额、能源供需弹性以及损害参数。我们表明，气候变化通过商品和能源的国际贸易产生了非平凡的再配置效应。推行单边政策会产生强烈的泄漏效应，主要通过能源贸易发生。全球气候政策合作可缓解泄漏效应，但并非所有国家都有参与的激励。区域性气候俱乐部的运作方式各不相同：欧盟范围内的俱乐部虽能减少全球排放，但在内部造成了赢家与输家的分化；而东南亚国家联盟气候俱乐部实现的全球收益较小，却能为成员国带来福利提升。
Abstract
Abstract To combat global warming, climate policies like carbon taxes, renewable subsidies and carbon tariffs must be implemented to phase out fossil fuel consumption and lower emissions. Who are the winners and losers of such policies? Through a simple integrated assessment model with heterogeneous countries and international trade in goods and energy, we study both the costs of implementing these policies unilaterally and the local costs and global gains of international policy cooperation. To do so, we express and decompose welfare changes under different policy regimes to the first order as a function of sufficient statistics that depend on observables and identifiable elasticities, such as nations’ energy mix, energy rents, trade shares, energy supply and demand elasticities, and damage parameters. We show that climate change has non-trivial reallocation effects through international trade in goods and energy. Pursuing unilateral policies generates strong leakage effects, primarily through energy trade. Global climate policy cooperation mitigates leakage, but not all countries have an incentive to participate. Regional climate clubs operate differently: an EU-wide club reduces global emissions but creates internal winners and losers, while an Association of Southeast Asian Nations climate club achieves smaller global gains, but delivers welfare increases for member nations.