独自更好？市镇合作成本的证据
Better Alone? Evidence on the Costs of Intermunicipal Cooperation
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2021 · [{"name": "Clémence Tricaud", "affiliation": ["Center for Economic and Policy Research", "University of California, Los Angeles"]}]
中文摘要
本文就市镇为何常常不愿整合提供了新的证据。利用法国一项使市际合作强制化的改革，我发现被迫整合的市镇经历了建筑活动的大幅增加，这与邻避效应一致，可以解释其抵制行为，且农村市镇最终获得的本地公共服务有所减少。对于在该法律出台前已自愿整合的市镇，我没有发现相同的效应，而两类市镇在公共交通和财政收入方面均享有相似的收益。这些发现支持了这样一个事实：市镇抵制整合是为了规避整合带来的本地成本。（JEL H70, R38, R51, R53, R58）
Abstract
This paper provides new evidence on why municipalities are often reluctant to integrate. Exploiting a French reform that made inter-municipal cooperation mandatory, I find that municipalities forced to integrate experienced a large increase in construction, consistent with NIMBYism, explaining their resistance and that rural municipalities ended up with fewer local public services. I do not find the same effects for municipalities that had voluntarily integrated prior to the law, while both types of municipality enjoyed similar benefits in terms of public transport and fiscal revenues. These findings support the fact that municipalities resisted to avoid the local costs of integration. (JEL H70, R38, R51, R53, R58)