司法俘获、地方保护主义与经济一体化：来自中国的证据
Court Capture, Local Protectionism, and Economic Integration: Evidence from China
Review of Economics and Statistics · 2026 · [{"name": "Ernest Liu", "affiliation": ["Princeton University"]}, {"name": "Yi Lu", "affiliation": ["Tsinghua University"]}, {"name": "Wenwei Peng", "affiliation": ["Hong Kong Baptist University"]}, {"name": "Shaoda Wang", "affiliation": ["University of Chicago"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 发展中国家的法院俘获现象普遍存在，但其经济影响仍未得到充分研究。我们考察了中国一项改革，该改革将地方法院的财政权与人事权从地方政府上收至省级政府。利用其交错（分批）推进，我们发现，本地被告在面对非本地原告时的胜诉率下降了 7.3%，同时司法质量有所提升。该改革鼓励了规模较小的非本地企业提起诉讼，并吸引了非本地投资，可能使 GDP 提高 1.9%。然而，对具有政治关联企业的偏袒以及省际保护主义依然存在，且集权本身会提拔资质较差的法官——由此既显示出该改革的潜力，也暴露出其局限。
Abstract
Abstract Court capture in developing countries is pervasive, yet its economic effects remain underexplored. We study a Chinese reform that transferred financial and personnel authority over local courts from local to provincial governments. Exploiting the staggered roll-out, we find a 7.3% decline in local defendants’ win rates against non-local plaintiffs, alongside improved judicial quality. The reform encouraged smaller non-local firms to litigate and attracted non-local investment, potentially raising GDP by 1.9%. Yet favoritism toward politically connected firms and inter-provincial protectionism remain, and centralization itself promotes less qualified judges— revealing both its promise and limits.