阻挡开发：地方控制、住房供给与邻避主义者
Warding off Development: Local Control, Housing Supply, and NIMBYs
Review of Economics and Statistics · 2022 · [{"name": "Evan Mast", "affiliation": ["W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research"]}]
中文摘要
土地使用规制的地方控制会产生“不在我家后院”（NIMBY）问题，可能抑制住房建设，推动价格上涨，并可能减缓经济增长。本文利用一项常见的选举改革——镇议会选举从“全镇选举”改为“选区选举”——研究地方控制增强如何影响住房生产。这类改革通常并非由住房市场因素驱动，其将每位代表的选区范围从整个城镇缩小到一个选区。基于多种双重差分估计量的结果显示，这种分权使获批住房单元数减少20%，对多户住宅与单户住宅许可的影响相近。在白人占比更高、收入更高的城镇，这种影响更大。
Abstract
Abstract Local control of land-use regulation creates a not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) problem that can suppress housing construction, contributing to rising prices and potentially slowing economic growth. I study how increased local control affects housing production by exploiting a common electoral reform—changing from “at-large” to “ward” elections for town council. These reforms, which are not typically motivated by housing markets, shrink each representative’s constituency from the entire town to one ward. Results from a variety of difference-in-differences estimators show that this decentralization decreases housing units permitted by 20%, with similar effects on multi- and single-family permits. Effects are larger in whiter and higher-income towns.