党派杰利蝾螈式选区划分的瞄准对象与影响：来自立法断点的证据
The Targeting and Impact of Partisan Gerrymandering: Evidence from a Legislative Discontinuity
Review of Economics and Statistics · 2022 · [{"name": "Dahyeon Jeong", "affiliation": ["World Bank"]}, {"name": "Ajay Shenoy", "affiliation": ["University of California, Santa Cruz"]}]
中文摘要
当一个政党在州议会中的席位份额超过50%时，其对选区重划的影响力会出现不连续的跃升。我们运用聚束检验（bunching tests）表明，在选区重划前的选举中，政党会系统性地在那些其近期美国众议院选举中失利的州议会中赢得微弱多数。尽管临界点附近各州的众议院总体得票份额并未发生变化，但这种败选趋势在选区重划后发生了逆转。断点回归估计值在选区重划前后的变化表明，掌控选区重划的政党使其赢得众议院选举的概率提高了11个百分点。
Abstract
Abstract A party’s influence over redistricting increases discontinuously when its seat share in the state legislature exceeds 50%. We apply bunching tests to show that, in the election before redistricting, parties systematically win narrow majorities in legislatures of states where they have lost recent U.S. House races. This trend of losses is reversed after redistricting despite no change in overall House vote shares in states near the cutoff. The pre-to-post-redistricting change in regression discontinuity estimates implies that the party that controls redistricting engineers an 11 percentage point increase in its probability of winning a House race.