退休收入替代型福利中的动态激励

Review of Economics and Statistics · 2022 · [{"name": "Andrés Dean", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Sebastián Fleitas", "affiliation": ["Center for Economic and Policy Research", "United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean", "KU Leuven"]}, {"name": "Mariana Zerpa", "affiliation": ["University of Chile", "KU Leuven"]}]

中文摘要

我们分析养老金制度中的动态激励，这类激励源于仅使用退休前少数最终年份的收入来计算养老金福利。利用乌拉圭的社会保障记录和住户调查数据，我们发现，自雇劳动者以及部分小企业雇员会通过在福利计算窗口内提高申报收入来应对这些激励。证据表明，这种反应源于收入申报方式的变化，而非总收入或劳动供给本身的变化。粗略测算表明，这一行为使养老金成本增加了约相当于GDP 0.2%的规模。

Abstract

Abstract We analyze dynamic incentives in pension systems created by the use of a small set of final years of earnings to compute benefits. Using social security records and household surveys from Uruguay, we show that self-employed workers and some employees of small firms respond to these incentives by increasing reported earnings in the benefit calculation window. We find evidence that suggests that these responses are explained by changes in earnings reporting and not in total earnings or labor supply. Back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate that this behavior increases the cost of pensions by about 0.2% of the GDP.