Imperfect Competition and Rents in Labor and Product Markets: The Case of the Construction Industry
American Economic Review · 2025 · Kory Kroft、Yao Luo、Magne Mogstad、Bradley Setzler
中文摘要
我们构建、识别并估计了一个劳动力市场和产品市场均存在不完全竞争的模型。我们的研究背景是美国建筑业，该行业中企业为争夺工人、私人市场项目和政府采购项目而相互竞争。我们的实证方法利用了与雇主-雇员税务记录相关联的采购拍卖投标数据。我们发现，两个市场中的不完全竞争共同导致总工资压低幅度超过30%，总价格加成约为45%。相比之下，如果错误地假定产品（劳动力）市场为完全竞争，则会得出工资（价格）仅被压低（抬高）20%（16%）的结论。(JEL D21, D24, H76, J31, L13, L74)
Abstract
We develop, identify, and estimate a model of imperfect competition in both labor and product markets. Our context is the US construction industry, where firms compete for workers, private market projects, and government procurements. Our empirical approach leverages bidding data from procurement auctions linked to employer-employee tax records. We find imperfect competition in both markets generates a total wage markdown of more than 30 percent and a total price markup of around 45 percent. By contrast, if one erroneously assumed a perfectly competitive product (labor) market, then one would conclude wages (prices) are marked down (up) by only 20 percent (16 percent). (JEL D21, D24, H76, J31, L13, L74)