中文摘要
本文表明，自雇塑造了低收入国家的劳动力市场势力，并对产业发展具有影响。利用秘鲁数据，我们发现雇主的工资设定权随雇主集中度提高而增强，但在自雇更为普遍的地区，这种增强幅度较小。一个一般均衡模型表明，在寡头买方垄断的劳动力市场中，自雇提高了工资劳动的供给弹性，从而削弱了雇主的劳动力市场势力。然而，基于同一机制，旨在扩大工资就业并降低对自雇依赖的促进竞争政策，可能无意中强化劳动力市场势力，从而削弱其政策目标。(JEL J22, J23, J31, J42, L13, O14, O15)
Abstract
This paper shows that self-employment shapes labor market power in low-income countries, with implications for industrial development. Using Peruvian data, we find that wage-setting power increases with employer concentration but less so where self-employment is more prevalent. A general equilibrium model shows that in oligopsonistic labor markets, self-employment raises the supply elasticity of wage labor, weakening employer market power. However, by the same mechanism, procompetitive policies aimed at expanding wage employment and reducing reliance on self-employment may unintentionally strengthen labor market power, undermining their objectives. (JEL J22, J23, J31, J42, L13, O14, O15)