可选提交考试成绩的招生政策

American Economic Review · 2025 · [{"name": "Wouter Dessein", "affiliation": ["Columbia University"]}, {"name": "Alex Frankel", "affiliation": ["University of Chicago"]}, {"name": "Navin Kartik", "affiliation": ["University of the District of Columbia"]}]

中文摘要

美国许多高校现在采用可选提交考试成绩的招生政策。一种常见的说法是，通过不查看标准化考试成绩，高校能够录取其更偏好的学生群体，例如多样性更高的群体。但观察更少的信息为何能够改善决策？本文提出，可选提交考试成绩政策是招生决策面临社会压力的一种回应。我们构建了一个高校模型：当高校做出“社会”不喜欢的招生决策时，会承受负效用。采用可选提交考试成绩政策使高校能够降低其“分歧成本”。我们分析了缺失成绩如何被插补，以及由此给高校、学生与社会带来的后果。(JEL I23, I28)

Abstract

Many US colleges now use test-optional admissions. A frequent claim is that by not seeing standardized test scores, a college can admit a student body it prefers, say, with more diversity. But how can observing less information improve decisions? This paper proposes that test-optional policies are a response to social pressure on admission decisions. We model a college that bears disutility when it makes admission decisions that “society” dislikes. Going test optional allows the college to reduce its “disagreement cost.” We analyze how missing scores are imputed and the consequences for the college, students, and society. (JEL I23, I28)