总量管制与交易及碳税遇见阿罗-德布鲁
Cap‐and‐Trade and Carbon Tax Meet Arrow–Debreu
Econometrica · 2025 · [{"name": "Robert M. Anderson", "affiliation": ["Harbin Institute of Technology", "University of California, Berkeley"]}, {"name": "Haosui Duanmu", "affiliation": ["Harbin Institute of Technology"]}]
中文摘要
我们提出两个一般均衡模型：配额均衡与排放税均衡。政府规定排放配额或排放税，此后不再采取进一步行动。无论政府如何选择其排放目标，所有结果均保持有效。配额均衡存在；排放产权的分配会影响福利分配。如果唯一的外部性来自总净排放量，则在总净排放量相同的所有可行结果中，配额均衡是帕累托最优的。对于某些税率，排放税均衡可能不存在。每一个配额均衡都可以实现为排放税均衡，反之亦然。然而，单一配额在均衡中可能产生不同的配额价格，单一税率在均衡中也可能产生不同的排放水平。这导致配额均衡与排放税均衡之间存在不等价性。
Abstract
We propose two general equilibrium models, quota equilibrium, and emission tax equilibrium. Government specifies quotas or taxes on emissions, and then refrains from further action. All results remain valid regardless of how government chooses its emissions target. Quota equilibrium exists; the allocation of emission property rights impacts the distribution of welfare. If the only externality arises from total net emissions, quota equilibrium is Pareto optimal among all feasible outcomes with the same total net emissions. For certain tax rates, emission tax equilibrium may not exist. Every quota equilibrium can be realized as an emission tax equilibrium and vice versa. However, different quota prices may arise in equilibrium from a single quota, and different emission levels may arise in equilibrium from a single tax rate. This leads to inequivalence between quota and emission tax equilibria.