The Effects of Mandatory Profit-Sharing on Workers and Firms: Evidence from France
Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2023 · Elio Nimier-David、David Sraer、David Thesmar
中文摘要
自1967年以来，法国所有雇员超过100人的企业均须将一部分超额利润与员工分享。通过这一制度，存在超额利润的企业平均将其税前收入的10.5%分配给劳动者。1990年，适用门槛降至50名员工。我们利用这一监管变化识别强制利润分享对企业及其员工的影响。改革前在100名员工门槛处观察到的显著集聚现象，清楚地体现了强制利润分享给企业带来的成本；改革后，这一现象完全消失。采用双重差分策略，我们发现，在企业层面，强制利润分享：（i）使劳动收入份额提高1.8个百分点；（ii）使利润份额降低1.4个百分点；（iii）对投资和生产率的影响很小或不存在。在员工层面，强制利润分享提高了低技能劳动者的总薪酬，而高技能劳动者的总薪酬保持不变。总体而言，强制利润分享将企业的超额利润再分配给低技能劳动者，同时未造成显著扭曲，也未产生显著的生产率效应。
Abstract
Since 1967, all French firms with more than 100 employees have been required to share a fraction of their excess profits with their employees. Through this scheme, firms with excess profits distribute, on average, 10.5% of their pretax income to workers. In 1990, the eligibility threshold was reduced to 50 employees. We exploit this regulatory change to identify the effects of mandated profit-sharing on firms and their employees. The cost of mandated profit-sharing for firms is evident in the significant bunching at the 100-employee threshold observed prior to the reform, which completely disappears post-reform. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we find that at the firm level, mandated profit-sharing (i) increases the labor share by 1.8 percentage points, (ii) reduces the profit share by 1.4 percentage points, and (iii) has small to nonexistent effects on investment and productivity. At the employee level, mandated profit-sharing increases lower-skilled workers’ total compensation and leaves high-skilled workers’ total compensation unchanged. Overall, mandated profit-sharing redistributes excess profits to lower-skilled workers in the firm without generating significant distortions or productivity effects.