谁承担垄断的福利成本？以信用卡行业为例
Who Bears the Welfare Costs of Monopoly? The Case of the Credit Card Industry
Review of Economic Studies · 2024 · [{"name": "Kyle Herkenhoff", "affiliation": ["University of Minnesota", "Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis"]}, {"name": "Gajendran Raveendranathan", "affiliation": ["McMaster University"]}]
中文摘要
摘要：本文衡量了20世纪70年代和80年代美国信用卡行业中非竞争行为造成的福利损失分布。早期信用卡行业以区域性垄断为特征。随后的一系列法律裁决带来了竞争性改革，使竞争程度提高，但仍属有限的寡头竞争。我们通过构建并估计一个包含寡头贷款人的异质性主体、可违约债务框架，来衡量这些改革的分配后果。从垄断向寡头竞争的转变带来的福利收益，相当于对收入最低十分位人群一次性转移3,600美元（按2016年美元计，约为其年收入的50%），而对收入最高十分位人群仅为1,200美元。随着信贷市场扩张，低收入家庭受益更多，因为他们在平滑消费时不成比例地依赖信贷。竞争加剧还解释了破产率、坏账冲销率以及信贷收入比的上升。最后，我们通过计算完全竞争基准，界定了竞争带来的福利收益的上限。总体而言，完全竞争带来的总福利收益比寡头竞争高40%，但其分布与寡头竞争相似。
Abstract
Abstract We measure the distribution of welfare losses from non-competitive behaviour in the U.S. credit card industry during the 1970s and 1980s. The early credit card industry was characterized by regional monopolies. Ensuing legal decisions led to competitive reforms that resulted in greater, but still limited, oligopolistic competition. We measure the distributional consequences of these reforms by developing and estimating a heterogeneous agent, defaultable debt framework with oligopolistic lenders. The transition from monopoly to oligopolistic competition yields welfare gains equivalent to a one-time transfer worth $3,600 (in 2016 dollars) for the bottom decile of earners (roughly 50% of their annual income) versus $1,200 for the top decile of earners. As the credit market expands, low-income households benefit more since they rely disproportionately on credit to smooth consumption. Greater competition also explains rising bankruptcies, chargeoffs, and credit to income ratios. Lastly, we bound the welfare gains from competition by computing a perfectly competitive benchmark. Aggregate welfare gains are 40% larger from perfect competition but distributed similarly to oligopolistic competition.