共付优惠券如何影响品牌药价格与购买数量？
How Do Copayment Coupons Affect Branded Drug Prices and Quantities Purchased?
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2024 · [{"name": "Leemore Dafny", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Kate Ho", "affiliation": ["Princeton University"]}, {"name": "Edward Kong", "affiliation": ["Harvard University"]}]
中文摘要
我们估计了药品共付优惠券——此类优惠券降低消费者购买品牌处方药的费用分担——对扣除返利后价格和销售数量的因果效应。聚焦于没有仿制药替代品的药品，我们发现，相对于禁止使用优惠券的Medicare Advantage（联邦医保优势计划），优惠券的引入使商业保险板块的销售数量增加了23-25%。为量化由此产生的均衡价格效应，我们估计了一个多发性硬化症药物需求的离散选择模型，并模拟了药品价格谈判模型。我们估计，对于其中大多数药品，由于优惠券的可得性，扣除返利后的价格提高了8%。
Abstract
We estimate the causal effects of drug copayment coupons, which reduce consumer cost-sharing for branded prescription drugs, on net-of-rebate price and quantities sold. Focusing on drugs without generic substitutes, we show that coupon introductions increase quantity sold by 23-25% for the commercial segment relative to Medicare Advantage, where coupons are banned. To quantify the resulting equilibrium price effects, we estimate a discrete choice model of demand for multiple sclerosis drugs and simulate a model of drug price negotiations. We estimate that net-of-rebate prices are 8% higher due to the availability of coupons for most of these drugs.