政府转移支付与支持国家干预的投票
Government Transfers and Votes for State Intervention
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2024 · [{"name": "Giuseppe Albanese", "affiliation": ["Bank of Italy"]}, {"name": "Guido de Blasio", "affiliation": ["Bank of Italy"]}, {"name": "Lorenzo Incoronato", "affiliation": ["University College London"]}]
中文摘要
政府转移支付可能对选举结果产生持久影响。我们研究了20世纪下半叶意大利实施的一项区域政策，并利用转移支付的变化，表明在该政策结束数十年后，主张在经济中实行更多国家干预的政党，在目标地区的表现优于未受补贴地区。这一效应似乎并不反映处理组与对照组地区经济表现上的长期差异（这些差异很小），也不反映选民中的其他态度。（JEL D72, H76, I38, N34, N44, R53）
Abstract
Government transfers might have long-lasting consequences on electoral outcomes. We study a regional policy implemented in Italy over the second half of the twentieth century and leverage variation in transfers to show that parties promoting more state intervention in the economy performed better in the targeted areas relative to places that were not subsidized, decades after the end of the policy. This effect does not seem to mirror long-term differences in the economic performance of treated and control areas, which were small, nor other attitudes within the electorate. (JEL D72, H76, I38, N34, N44, R53)