产品属性的最优内部性税收
Optimal Internality Taxation of Product Attributes
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2024 · [{"name": "Andreas Gerster", "affiliation": ["RWI – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research", "University of Mannheim"]}, {"name": "Michael Kramm", "affiliation": ["University of Cologne", "TU Dortmund University"]}]
中文摘要
本文探讨当消费者存在行为偏误时，仁慈的政策制定者应如何对产品属性进行最优征税（或补贴）。我们证明，市场选择蕴含关于偏误的信息，这些信息可通过非线性税收方案加以利用，以针对存在偏误的消费者。我们表明，该税收方案的性质取决于消费者估值与偏误联合分布中的少数几个参数。此外，我们为基于行为动机的产品标准提供了新的理由，并推导出何时税收与标准的组合是最优的。我们基于灯泡市场的一个数值例子说明了我们的发现。（JEL D82, D91, H21, H25, L69）
Abstract
This paper explores how a benevolent policymaker should optimally tax (or subsidize) product attributes when consumers are behaviorally biased. We demonstrate that market choices are informative about biases, which can be exploited for targeting biased consumers via a nonlinear tax schedule. We show that the properties of this schedule depend on few parameters of the joint distribution of consumer valuations and biases. Furthermore, we provide a novel justification for behaviorally motivated product standards and derive when a combination of taxes and standards is optimal. We illustrate our findings based on a numerical example from the lightbulb market. (JEL D82, D91, H21, H25, L69)