公共采购集中化的间接节约

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2024 · [{"name": "Clarissa Lotti", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Arieda Muço", "affiliation": ["Central European University"]}, {"name": "Giancarlo Spagnolo", "affiliation": ["University of Rome Tor Vergata", "Stockholm School of Economics"]}, {"name": "Tommaso Valletti", "affiliation": ["Imperial College London", "Norwegian School of Economics"]}]

中文摘要

公共采购集中化可以降低政府直接购买商品和服务的价格。本文关注间接节约。未直接通过中央采购机构采购的公共行政部门，可能受益于中央集中采购商品的可得性。我们利用意大利设立中央采购机构这一情形，发现自主采购的行政部门价格下降了22%。这些间接效应似乎是由信息外部性驱动的，尤其是在采购技术更复杂商品、能力较弱的公共采购方中更为明显。将间接节约纳入考量，会提高对直接节约的估计。（JEL D83, H57, H83）

Abstract

Centralization of public procurement can lower prices for the government’s direct purchase of goods and services. This paper focuses on indirect savings. Public administrations that do not procure directly through a central procurement agency might benefit from the availability of centrally procured goods. We exploit the introduction of a central purchasing agency in Italy and find that prices came down by 22 percent among administrations that bought autonomously. These indirect effects appear to be driven by informational externalities, especially for less competent public buyers purchasing technologically more complex goods. Accounting for indirect savings increases the estimate of direct ones. (JEL D83, H57, H83)