American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2024 · Gaurav Kankanhalli、Alan Kwan、Kenneth J. Merkley
中文摘要
创新型企业必须在向投资者披露与对竞争对手保密之间进行权衡。我们利用美国上市公司依法强制披露、但内容可被暂时涂黑的知识产权许可合同样本，研究这一权衡。通过对涂黑信息进行人工分类，我们发现，处于竞争性市场且拥有高价值知识产权的企业更常涂黑知识产权信息。市场对知识产权信息的涂黑反应积极，这与理论预测一致——该理论论证了一种分离均衡：在其中，不披露信号传递了更高价值的知识产权。我们的结果表明，在老练投资者的促进下，可信的不披露部分缓解了创新型上市公司所面临的信息摩擦。(JEL D22, D82, G38, L24, O32, O34)
Abstract
Innovative firms must trade off disclosing to investors and maintaining secrecy from competitors. We study this trade-off in a sample of IP licenses mandatorily disclosed by US public firms, whose contents can be temporarily redacted. Hand classifying the redacted information, we find that firms with valuable IP in competitive markets redact IP information more often. Markets react positively to the redaction of IP information, consistent with theoretical predictions rationalizing a separating equilibrium in which nondisclosure signals more valuable IP. Our results suggest that credible nondisclosure partially resolves information frictions for innovative public firms when facilitated by sophisticated investors. (JEL D22, D82, G38, L24, O32, O34)