最优罪恶税与市场势力
Optimal Sin Taxation and Market Power
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2024 · [{"name": "Martin O’Connell", "affiliation": ["University of Wisconsin–Madison"]}, {"name": "Kate Smith", "affiliation": ["Institute for Fiscal Studies", "London School of Economics and Political Science"]}]
中文摘要
本文研究市场势力如何影响罪恶税的效率与再分配属性，并以含糖饮料税为实证应用。我们估计了英国饮料市场的均衡模型，并将其嵌入税收设计框架，以求解最优含糖饮料税政策。饮料行业正的价格成本加成造成了低效率，使最优税率低于完全竞争情形下的水平。由于利润主要归富人所有，这一效应在社会公平偏好下得到部分缓解。总体而言，在制定税收政策时忽视市场势力，会导致福利收益比最优水平低40%。(JEL D62, H21, H23, H25, L13, L25, L66)
Abstract
We study how market power impacts the efficiency and redistributive properties of sin taxation, with an empirical application to sugar-sweetened beverage taxation. We estimate an equilibrium model of the UK drinks market, which we embed in a tax design framework to solve for optimal sugar-sweetened beverage tax policy. Positive price-cost margins for drinks create inefficiencies that lower the optimal rate compared with a perfectly competitive setting. Since profits mainly accrue to the rich, this is partially mitigated under social preferences for equity. Overall, ignoring market power when setting tax policy leads to welfare gains 40 percent below those at the optimum. (JEL D62, H21, H23, H25, L13, L25, L66)