审计造成的扭曲：来自公共采购的证据

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2024 · [{"name": "María Paula Gerardino", "affiliation": ["Inter-American Development Bank"]}, {"name": "Stephan Litschig", "affiliation": ["National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies"]}, {"name": "Dina Pomeranz", "affiliation": ["Center for Economic and Policy Research", "University of Zurich"]}]

中文摘要

公共部门审计是国家能力的关键，但也可能造成意外的扭曲。基于智利数据的断点回归分析显示，审计降低了公共采购中拍卖方式的使用，减少了供应商竞争，并提高了小型、本地和在位企业赢得合同的可能性。深入审视审计过程的“黑箱”后发现，相较于可比的直接合同，拍卖经历的检查次数是其两倍以上，被发现的违规行为数量也达到其两倍。这些发现表明，标准审计规程可能机械地抑制那些监管更严格、更复杂、透明度更高、涉及更多可审计步骤的采购方式的使用。(JEL H57, H83, O17)

Abstract

Public sector audits are key to state capacity. However, they can create unintended distortions. Regression discontinuity analysis from Chile shows that audits lowered the use of auctions for public procurement, reduced supplier competition, and increased the likelihood of small, local, and incumbent firms winning contracts. Looking inside the black box of the audit process reveals that relative to comparable direct contracts, auctions underwent more than twice as many checks and led to twice as many detected infractions. These findings show that standard audit protocols can mechanically discourage the use of more regulated, complex, and transparent procedures involving more auditable steps. (JEL H57, H83, O17)