企业对雇佣和投资补贴的反应：来自加州竞争税收减免的断点回归证据
Firm Responses to Hiring and Investment Subsidies: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from the California Competes Tax Credit
Review of Economics and Statistics · 2026 · [{"name": "Benjamin Hyman", "affiliation": ["University of California, Los Angeles"]}, {"name": "Matthew Freedman", "affiliation": ["St. Matthew's University"]}, {"name": "Shantanu Khanna", "affiliation": ["Northeastern University"]}, {"name": "David Neumark", "affiliation": ["University of California, Irvine"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 我们考察企业对州级招聘和投资补贴的反应。我们利用加州竞争税收抵免（California Competes Tax Credit, CCTC）的制度特征——这是一项大规模的商业激励计划, 吸收了以往就业创造政策的最佳实践。CCTC 的奖励遴选程序结合了基于公式的部分与自由裁量的部分。我们在断点回归设计中利用申请人得分的资格临界点, 并借助关于经营机构（establishments）及其母公司的丰富纵向微观数据, 发现企业会响应 CCTC 奖励而扩大其在加州的就业。几乎没有证据表明这些扩张是以牺牲企业在其他州的经营为代价的。我们的结果表明, 有针对性且经过审计的招聘和投资补贴能够有效促进本地企业扩张, 而不会引发显著的跨州转移效应。
Abstract
Abstract We examine firm responses to state hiring and investment subsidies. We leverage institutional features of the California Competes Tax Credit (CCTC), a large-scale business incentive program that incorporates best practices from prior job creation policies. The CCTC award selection procedure combines formula-based and discretionary components. Leveraging applicant score eligibility cutoffs in a regression discontinuity design and taking advantage of rich longitudinal microdata on establishments and their parent firms, we find that businesses expand employment in California in response to CCTC awards. There is little evidence that these expansions come at the expense of firms’ operations in other states. Our results suggest that targeted and audited hiring and investment subsidies can be effective in promoting local business expansions without inducing significant cross-state displacement effects.