主观学校评级对校长薪酬与流动的影响
The impact of subjective school ratings on principal compensation and turnover
Journal of Public Economics · 2025 · [{"name": "Iftikhar Hussain", "affiliation": ["University of Sussex"]}, {"name": "Vincenzo Scrutinio", "affiliation": ["IZA - Institute of Labor Economics", "London School of Economics and Political Science", "University of Bologna"]}, {"name": "Shqiponja Telhaj", "affiliation": ["University of Sussex", "London School of Economics and Political Science"]}]
中文摘要
已有研究表明，基于客观考试成绩的学校问责措施会影响学校领导者。另一方面，主观评价能够对学校质量提供更为细致的评估。本文考察主观学校督导评级对校长薪酬和职业结果的影响。评级不仅反映学校整体质量，还捕捉领导力质量、教学与学生成绩等更细致的方面。采用双重差分框架，我们发现学校整体督导评级对校长薪酬及其退出公立学校教育体系的比例具有实质性影响。这些效应高度不对称：评级下调的影响远大于评级提升。我们的发现表明，竞争是学校督导评级变化影响校长的关键机制。关键的是，借助详细的质量评级，我们首次证明，劳动力市场能够区分关于学校整体质量的信号与专门针对高级管理质量的信号。
Abstract
Prior research has established that objective, test-score-based school accountability measures impact school leaders. Subjective evaluations, on the other hand, can provide a more nuanced assessment of school quality. This paper investigates the impact of subjective school inspection ratings on the salary and career outcomes of school principals. Ratings capture not just overall school quality, but also more granular aspects such as leadership quality, teaching and student achievement. Employing a difference-in-differences framework, we find that the overall school inspection rating has substantial impact on principals’ salaries and their rate of exit from public sector schooling. These effects are highly asymmetric: worse ratings have a substantially larger impact compared to rating improvements. Our findings suggest that competition is a key mechanism through which changes in school inspection ratings affect principals. Crucially, by leveraging detailed quality ratings, we show for the first time that the labor market can distinguish between signals concerning overall school quality and those specific to senior management quality.