根本性改革残障保险体系：来自德国的证据

Review of Economics and Statistics · 2026 · [{"name": "Yaming Cao", "affiliation": ["Centre for European Economic Research"]}, {"name": "Björn Fischer-Weckemann", "affiliation": ["Centre for European Economic Research"]}, {"name": "Johannes Geyer", "affiliation": ["German Institute for Economic Research"]}, {"name": "Nicolas Ziebarth", "affiliation": ["University of Mannheim"]}]

中文摘要

摘要 2001年，德国取消了针对1960年以后出生队列的公共职业残疾保险（ODI）——即其公共残疾保险（DI）体系的第二层级。利用行政数据，我们首先记录到，从长期来看，总体残疾保险（DI）流入下降了约三分之一。其次，利用代表性调查数据，我们发现，在缺乏保证承保的私人个人、风险定价市场中，ODI 保险的投保反应至多是温和的。第三，一个纳入公共安全网、第一层公共残疾保险与私人市场之间相互作用的均衡模型显示，由互补性社会保险驱动的拒保和较弱的保险需求，可以解释私人 ODI 投保反应之温和。因此，按收入和健康状况划分的覆盖梯度相当大。最后，反事实模拟凸显了渐进式改革的有限空间。

Abstract

Abstract In 2001, Germany abolished public occupational disability insurance (ODI)—the second tier of its public DI system—for cohorts born after 1960. Using administrative data, we first document that, in the long run, overall DI inflows declined by roughly one-third. Second, using representative survey data, we document at best modest ODI insurance take-up responses in the private individual, risk-rated market, which lacks guaranteed issue. Third, an equilibrium model incorporating interactions between the public safety net, the first-tier public DI, and the private market reveals that coverage denials and weak insurance demand, driven by complementary social insurance, can explain the modest private ODI take-up response. Coverage gradients by income and health are thus substantial. Finally, counterfactual simulations highlight the limited scope of incremental reforms.