分层社会中的信息加总
Information Aggregation in Stratified Societies
The Economic Journal · 2025 · [{"name": "Marina Agranov", "affiliation": ["California Institute of Technology", "Alltech (United States)", "n&k Technology (United States)"]}, {"name": "Ran Eilat", "affiliation": ["Ben-Gurion University of the Negev"]}, {"name": "Konstantin Sonin", "affiliation": ["University of Chicago"]}]
中文摘要
摘要：我们分析了一个政治竞争模型，其中精英内生形成以加总信息，并向不知情的中位选民建议应选择哪位候选人。中位选民知道被背书的候选人是否偏向精英，但如果精英的背书就候选人的能力提供了充分信息，中位选民仍可能偏好这位有偏候选人。精英规模及精英信息加总的程度取决于中位选民在多大程度上听从精英建议。更高的再分配成本会最小化精英的信息优势，阻碍信息传递，并降低当选政治家的预期能力。
Abstract
Abstract We analyse a model of political competition in which the elite form endogenously to aggregate information and advise the uninformed median voter which candidate to choose. The median voter knows whether or not the endorsed candidate is biased toward the elites, but might still prefer the biased candidate if the elite’s endorsement provides sufficient information about her competence. The elite size and the degree of information aggregation by the elite depend on the extent to which the median voter follows the elite’s advice. A higher cost of redistribution minimises the elite’s information advantage, hinders information transmission and decreases the expected competence of the elected politician.