有效寄售拍卖
Efficient Consignment Auctions
Review of Economics and Statistics · 2023 · [{"name": "Bing Liu", "affiliation": ["Stanford University"]}, {"name": "Simon Loertscher", "affiliation": ["The University of Melbourne"]}, {"name": "Leslie M. Marx", "affiliation": ["Duke University"]}]
中文摘要
寄售拍卖是一种用于（重新）分配排放许可的两阶段机制：企业首先被赋予许可，随后被允许对其进行交易。我们从理论上确定了在满足激励相容、个体理性和无赤字约束下，能够实现有效率配置的初始赋予。所有企业都更偏好有效率的寄售拍卖而非有效率的标准拍卖，这使其在政治上更易被接受。在有效率的寄售拍卖中，企业的投资激励与第一最优水平相一致。基于有效率长期配置的祖父制会诱导出允许效率实现的初始赋予。对南加州RECLAIM项目数据的简单校准验证了我们的无赤字假设，并表明祖父制在理论上与经验观察到的初始赋予最为匹配。
Abstract
Abstract Consignment auctions are two-stage mechanisms to (re)allocate emission permits. Firms are first endowed with permits and then allowed to trade them. We determine theoretically endowments that enable efficient allocation, subject to incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and no deficit. All firms prefer efficient consignment auctions to efficient standard auctions, making them politically palatable. Firms’ investment incentives align with the first-best in efficient consignment auctions. Grandfathering based on efficient long-run allocations induces efficiency-permitting endowments. A simple calibration to data from Southern California’s RECLAIM program validates our no-deficit assumption and shows that grandfathering provides the best theoretical match for the empirically observed endowments.