Journal of Development Economics · 2026 · Marco Casari、Maurizio Lisciandra、Ali Seyhun Saral
中文摘要
我们研究了三百多个意大利社区中长达六个世纪的公地治理制度变迁。面对因资源禀赋不平等而产生的迁移压力，较富裕的社区通过将女性排除在成员资格之外，限制了对公共财产资源的准入，从而限制了通过婚姻实现的迁移。利用档案数据和一个基于主体的模型，我们表明这种内生性封闭通过多米诺效应扩散，并一直持续到拿破仑时期的中央集权改革重新确立平等准入为止。这些发现凸显了迁移、不平等与性别化制度在多中心体系中如何相互作用，为发展中情境下土地产权与制度改革的政治经济学提供了更广泛的启示。• 我们追踪了意大利数百个社区公地六个世纪的制度变迁。• 不平等和迁移压力促使各社区做出封闭的分散化选择。• 网络外部性塑造了这一制度变迁的传播与持续。• 基于主体的模型复现了封闭、多米诺效应与锁定的经验模式。• 中央集权改革是恢复社区开放性的必要条件。
Abstract
We study six centuries of institutional change in the governance of the commons across over three hundred Italian communities. Wealthier communities, facing migration pressure due to unequal resource endowments, restricted access to common property resources by excluding women from membership, thereby limiting migration through marriage. Using archival data and an agent-based model, we show that this endogenous closure spread via a domino effect and persisted until a centralized Napoleonic reform reinstated egalitarian access. The findings highlight how migration, inequality, and gendered institutions interact in polycentric systems, offering broader insights for the political economy of property rights on land and institutional reform in developing contexts. • We trace six centuries of institutional change in hundreds of community commons in Italy. • Inequality and migration pressures drove decentralized choices to close communities. • Network externalities shaped the propagation and persistence of institutional change. • Agent-based model replicates the empirical patterns of closure, domino effect, and lock-in. • Centralized reform was necessary to restore openness to communities.