以新精英挽救旧政权？中国吸纳海外留学议员的非预期效应
Saving an old regime with new elites? The unintended effects of co-opting foreign-educated councilors in China
Journal of Development Economics · 2025 · [{"name": "Чу Лин", "affiliation": ["Shanghai University of Finance and Economics"]}, {"name": "Wei Sun", "affiliation": ["Shanghai University of Finance and Economics"]}, {"name": "Chengli Wang", "affiliation": ["University of Macau"]}]
中文摘要
吸纳受海外教育的精英如何影响地方稳定？本研究利用1909年中国设立省级咨议局所形成的准实验情境，考察将留日归国者纳入地方治理的政治后果。利用一份涵盖1901年至1911年262个府的原创府-月面板数据集，我们发现，吸纳海外留学精英产生了非预期效应：它显著减少了革命武装斗争（“革命效应”），但同时增加了农民起义（“起义效应”）。机制分析表明，归国者倡导的改革加剧了地方税负——尤其是在经济拮据地区——从而引发了农民起义。我们的研究发现凸显了专制政权现代化进程中的一个关键权衡：当精英的改革抱负超越社会的适应能力时，善意的改革可能引发非预期的反弹。
Abstract
How does the co-optation of foreign-educated elites influence local stability? This study exploits a quasi-experimental setting created by the establishment of provincial Consultative Bureaus in China in 1909 to examine the political consequences of integrating Japan-educated returnees into local governance. Using an original, prefecture-by-month panel dataset across 262 prefectures from 1901 to 1911, we find that co-opting foreign-educated elites produced unintended effects: it significantly reduced revolutionary armed struggles (the “revolution effect”), but simultaneously increased peasant revolts (the “revolt effect”). Mechanism analysis suggests that returnees advocated reforms that intensified local tax burdens—particularly in economically strained regions—provoking peasant revolts. Our findings underscore a critical trade-off in the modernization efforts of autocratic regimes: when elites’ reformist ambitions outpace the adaptive capacity of society, well-intended reforms can generate unintended backlash.