美国医院行业的反垄断执法是否不足？
Is There Too Little Antitrust Enforcement in the US Hospital Sector?
AER: Insights · 2024 · [{"name": "Zarek Brot", "affiliation": ["University of Chicago"]}, {"name": "Zack Cooper", "affiliation": ["Yale University"]}, {"name": "Stuart Craig", "affiliation": ["University of Wisconsin–Madison"]}, {"name": "Lev Klarnet", "affiliation": []}]
中文摘要
2002年至2020年间，美国医院发生了1000多起合并。在此期间，联邦贸易委员会（FTC）对其中13起交易采取了执法行动。然而，利用FTC的标准筛查工具，我们发现这些合并中有20%本可被预测会显著削弱竞争。我们表明，2010年至2015年间，可预测地具有反竞争性的合并导致价格上涨超过5%。我们估计，根据《哈特-斯科特-罗迪诺法案》，约半数可预测的反竞争性合并本应向FTC申报。我们得出结论：医院行业的反垄断法执法似乎存在不足。（JEL G34, G38, I11, K21）
Abstract
From 2002 to 2020, there were over 1,000 mergers of US hospitals. During this period, the FTC took enforcement actions against 13 transactions. However, using the FTC’s standard screening tools, we find that 20 percent of these mergers could have been predicted to meaningfully lessen competition. We show that, from 2010 to 2015, predictably anticompetitive mergers resulted in price increases over 5 percent. We estimate that approximately half of predictably anticompetitive mergers had to be reported to the FTC per the Hart–Scott–Rodino Act. We conclude that there appears to be underenforcement of antitrust laws in the hospital sector. (JEL G34, G38, I11, K21)