金融顾问的良好操守问题
The Problem of Good Conduct among Financial Advisers
Journal of Economic Perspectives · 2024 · [{"name": "Mark Egan", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research"]}, {"name": "Gregor Matvos", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research"]}, {"name": "Amit Seru", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research"]}]
中文摘要
美国家庭在投资和储蓄决策中常常依赖金融顾问，但普遍存在许多顾问并不诚实的看法。这种不信任并非没有根据：约每十五名顾问中就有一人存在严重不当行为记录，在某些地区和公司中，这一比例上升至六分之一。我们探讨了金融顾问行业的经济基础，并说明家庭金融素养的异质性与利益冲突如何使劣质的金融建议得以持续存在。利用涵盖全体金融顾问的数据以及《消费者金融状况调查》(Survey of Consumer Finances)，我们记录了哪些人使用金融顾问，以及行业中不当行为的普遍程度。我们的研究结果表明，金融素养不足是一个关键摩擦因素，这使得加强信息披露可能成为一种有效的政策应对。为支持这一结论，我们通过双重差分(DID)方法表明，对不当行为率较高的公司进行“点名批评”（naming and shaming）与不当行为减少10%相关。
Abstract
Households in the United States often rely on financial advisers for investment and savings decisions, yet there is a widespread perception that many advisers are dishonest. This distrust is not unwarranted: approximately one in fifteen advisers has a history of serious misconduct, with this rate rising to one in six in certain regions and firms. We explore the economic foundations of the financial advisory industry and demonstrate how heterogeneity in household financial sophistication and conflicts of interest allow poor financial advice to persist. Using data on the universe of financial advisers and the Survey of Consumer Finances, we document who uses financial advisers and the prevalence of misconduct in the industry. Our findings suggest that a lack of financial sophistication is a key friction, making enhanced disclosure a potentially effective policy response. Supporting this, we show through a difference-in-differences approach that “naming and shaming” firms with high misconduct rates was associated with a 10 percent reduction in misconduct.