中文摘要
美国家庭在作出投资和储蓄决策时往往依赖金融顾问，但人们普遍认为许多顾问并不诚信。这种不信任并非毫无根据：大约每十五名顾问中就有一人曾有严重不当行为记录，而在某些地区和公司，这一比例高达每六人中一人。我们探讨金融咨询行业的经济基础，并说明家庭金融素养的异质性和利益冲突如何使劣质的金融建议得以持续存在。利用涵盖全体金融顾问的数据以及消费者财务调查数据，我们考察了哪些人使用金融顾问服务，以及该行业不当行为的普遍程度。研究结果表明，金融素养不足是一项关键摩擦因素，这使得加强信息披露可能成为一种有效的政策应对措施。作为佐证，我们通过双重差分方法发现，对不当行为率较高的公司进行“点名曝光”，与不当行为减少10%相关。
Abstract
Households in the United States often rely on financial advisers for investment and savings decisions, yet there is a widespread perception that many advisers are dishonest. This distrust is not unwarranted: approximately one in fifteen advisers has a history of serious misconduct, with this rate rising to one in six in certain regions and firms. We explore the economic foundations of the financial advisory industry and demonstrate how heterogeneity in household financial sophistication and conflicts of interest allow poor financial advice to persist. Using data on the universe of financial advisers and the Survey of Consumer Finances, we document who uses financial advisers and the prevalence of misconduct in the industry. Our findings suggest that a lack of financial sophistication is a key friction, making enhanced disclosure a potentially effective policy response. Supporting this, we show through a difference-in-differences approach that “naming and shaming” firms with high misconduct rates was associated with a 10 percent reduction in misconduct.